

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

May 15, 2020
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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Chief of Police

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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING NO. 033-19

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Officer Involved Shooting (OIS), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 033-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on April 6, 2020. I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On July 16, 2019, Officers J. Barrera, Serial No. 42791, and R. Yah Camara, Serial No. 42823, Rampart Patrol Division, were in full uniform, driving a marked black and white police vehicle.

According to Officer Barrera, he and Officer Yah Camara were regularly assigned partners and had worked together for *approximately six to seven months* prior to the day of the incident. Officer Barrera stated that he and Officer Yah Camara had previously discussed *contact* and *cover* roles and being able to *adapt* to differing situations. Specific to this incident, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara's tactical plan included Officer Barrera being *cover* and Officer Yah Camara being *point*.

According to Officer Yah Camara, he and Officer Barrera were regularly assigned partners and had worked together for *approximately eight* Deployment Periods.² Officer Yah Camara stated that he and Officer Barrera had previously discussed *contact* and *cover* roles as well as *lethal* and *less-lethal* force options.

At approximately 18:03:11 hours, Communications Division (CD) broadcast, "*Any Rampart unit, 415 Man, 309 North Commonwealth Avenue, the suspect, male Hispanic, under the influence and hallucinating, Code-Two, Incident 5277, RD 212.*"³

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² A deployment period consists of twenty-eight days.

³ "415 Man" refers to Section 415 of the California Penal Code (PC), Disturbing the Peace.

According to Officer Yah Camara, he and his partner *received a radio call*. The comments indicated that *there was a suspect, male Hispanic, hallucinating*. Additional comments of the call indicated that *the residents were fearful of him and were waiting outside*. As Officers Yah Camara and Barrera were driving to the location, they *believed that the suspect was waiting outside, as per the comments of the call*.

According to Officer Barrera, he placed himself and Officer Yah Camara at scene via the Mobile Digital Computer (MDC) in their police vehicle.

According to Officer Yah Camara, when he and Officer Barrera did not see a suspect matching the given description, they began to canvass the area. As Officers Yah Camara and Barrera, were canvassing the area, they were *flagged down* by witness W. Alonzo, who had earlier accompanied the Person Reporting (PR), later identified as M. Gutierrez, to Rampart Community Police Station (CPS). Alonzo advised the officers that the suspect, later identified as H. Vasquez, was still *at the apartment and in his room*. Officers Yah Camara and Barrera followed Alonzo and Gutierrez to the location at 309 North Commonwealth Avenue **(Additional/Equipment – Front Desk Procedures and Body Worn Video Activation)**.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Yah Camara asked Alonzo what Vasquez' name was, and Alonzo replied, "Herbert." Gutierrez advised the officers that Vasquez was her tenant and provided the officers with a brief physical description of Vasquez. Gutierrez believed that Vasquez was under the influence of narcotics and stated that he was behaving erratically. Officer Yah Camara asked Gutierrez if Vasquez had any weapons and she replied, "No." Gutierrez then directed the officers upstairs to her residence. As the officers walked toward Gutierrez' residence, she advised them that Vasquez was alone in his bedroom, but her husband, witness A. Padilla, was inside of the residence as well. Officer Yah Camara directed Gutierrez to wait at the bottom of the stairs.

According to Officer Barrera, Gutierrez described Vasquez' behavior as *hallucinating and talking to himself*. She additionally advised Vasquez *raised his hand and lunged at them, making movements as if he was going to hit them*.

According to the FID investigation, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara made contact with Padilla as they entered the apartment. Padilla directed them to the location of Vasquez' bedroom and informed the officers the bedroom door was locked. Padilla advised the officers that Vasquez was dangerous and Padilla wanted Vasquez removed from the residence. Officer Barrera explained the eviction process to Padilla and directed him to wait downstairs. Prior to exiting the residence, Padilla informed the officers that Vasquez only spoke Spanish.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Yah Camara walked to the south end of the hallway and positioned himself just east of Vasquez' door. As he did so, Officer Barrera remained near the north end of the hallway. Officer Yah Camara opened the east bedroom door and looked inside to ensure no one else was inside. Officer Yah Camara knocked on Vasquez' door and received no response. Officer Yah Camara attempted to open the bedroom door, but it was locked. Officer Yah Camara yelled out Herbert's name, then advised Officer Barrera that the

bedroom door was locked. Officer Barrera verbally identified themselves as police officers and asked Vasquez if they could speak with him. At that time, Officer Yah Camara redeployed backward and sought cover in the doorway of the east bedroom. Simultaneously, Officer Barrera stepped back and utilized the east wall of the hallway as cover. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara each made attempts to verbally contact Vasquez. Officer Yah Camara asked Vasquez, "*Que esta pasando*" (what is happening) and reached for the door handle with his right hand. Before Officer Yah Camara touched the handle, Officer Barrera directed him to get cover. Officer Yah Camara pointed to the east bedroom and advised Officer Barrera that he could seek cover there. Officer Barrera advised Officer Yah Camara that he would be able to see Vasquez' hands from his position, on the north end of the hallway. Officer Yah Camara decided to try Vasquez' door a second time. Using his right hand, Officer Yah Camara pushed down on the door handle and pulled the door open. After opening the door, Officer Yah Camara quickly redeployed to the doorway of the east bedroom **(Debriefing Point No. 1)**.

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, *it cracked maybe a foot and a half*. While standing approximately 10 to 11 feet away, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez wearing a red shirt and what Officer Barrera *believed to be two metal poles, one in each hand*.⁴ Officer Barrera drew his service pistol because he *saw the suspect armed with two objects* and Officer Yah Camara was *very, very close* to the Vasquez. Officer Yah Camara *was maybe three feet away from Vasquez* when the door opened. Officer Barrera believed that Vasquez was *going to be unpredictable and attack his partner and cause serious bodily injury*. Vasquez then *closed the door right away*. Officer Barrera *requested the additional unit and a supervisor*⁵ **(Drawing/Exhibiting and Debriefing Points No. 2 and 3)**.

According to the FID investigation, Officer Yah Camara asked Officer Barrera to inquire with the witnesses as to whether Vasquez suffered from mental illness. Officer Barrera agreed to do so. Officer Barrera holstered his pistol and walked out of the residence, followed by Officer Yah Camara. Padilla advised the officers that Vasquez did not suffer from mental illness. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara then walked back inside the residence. Officer Yah Camara knocked on Vasquez' bedroom door and continued to verbalize with Vasquez. While waiting for additional units to arrive, Officer Yah Camara advised Officer Barrera that he was going to open Vasquez' door. Officer Barrera advised Officer Yah Camara that he would provide cover and advised Officer Yah Camara to back into the east bedroom once the door was open. Officer Yah Camara opened the door and quickly redeployed into the east bedroom. As the cover officer, Officer Barrera unholstered his pistol, stepped to the left, and utilized the east hallway wall as cover. Once the door was open, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez standing in the bedroom near the doorway. Officer Barrera ordered Vasquez to come toward him. Vasquez did not comply with the command and immediately closed the door **(Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Barrera's Second Occurrence and Debriefing Point No. 4)**.

⁴ Force Investigation Division investigators did not observe, nor recover any additional evidence which resembled metal poles, with the exception of the machete and the large kitchen knife.

⁵ The FID investigation revealed that Officer Barrera requested an additional unit at 1819:03 hours and a supervisor at 1819:37 hours.

According to Officer Barrera, he did not recall observing Vasquez holding anything in his hands the second time Officer Yah Camara opened the door. Officer Barrera was concerned about Vasquez' mental state and wanted to de-escalate the situation. Officer Barrera *wanted to get Vasquez to willingly come out and then detain him for a mental evaluation hold, then contact MEU (Mental Evaluation Unit) and go from there.*

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1824:26 hours, Officer P. Nelson, Serial No. 42809, Rampart Division, arrived at scene in response to the additional unit request.

According to Officer Nelson, upon arrival at scene, he was briefed by Officer Barrera that Vasquez *had made vocal threats against his roommates* and when Officers Barrera and Yah Camara *attempted to open the door*, the officers *believe they saw Vasquez holding some kind of object*. Based on the information received from Officer Barrera, Officer Nelson *went and grabbed the 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL) from his police vehicle (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – 40mm LLL Manipulations and Additional/Equipment – Body Worn Video Activation).*⁶

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1824:50 hours, Officers D. Williams, Serial No. 41952, and B. Carlson, Serial No. 43122, Rampart Patrol Division, arrived at scene in response to the additional unit request. As they approached the residence, they passed Officer Nelson, who advised them that a person (Vasquez) with a mental illness was barricaded inside of the residence. Officer Nelson further advised them that he was enroute to retrieve a 40mm LLL from his police vehicle. Once inside the location, Officer Barrera advised Officers Carlson and Williams that no crime had occurred; however, Vasquez was possibly under the influence of narcotics and armed with metal poles.

According to Officer Williams, he drew his service pistol while *clearing the room* adjacent to Vasquez' bedroom because Officer Williams believed that he *might come in contact with an armed suspect and needed to be able to protect himself (Drawing/Exhibiting).*

According to Officer Barrera, he formulated a tactical plan as they awaited the arrival of a supervisor. Officer Barrera designated himself and Officer Yah Camara as the point officers, Officer Nelson as the *less-lethal* force option, and Officers Williams and Carlson as the *arrest team (Debriefing Point No. 4).*

According to Officer Yah Camara, he heard a noise resembling a sword or a knife being removed from a sheath emitting from Vasquez' bedroom. Officer Yah Camara advised Officer Barrera of what he heard.

⁶ During the UOFRB, Captain A. Gonzalez, Serial No. 34703, Commanding Officer, Rampart Patrol Division, presented that in the summer of 2019, the 40mm LLL carrying bags were being replaced and due to their smaller storage capacity, provided only three 40mm eXact iMPact rounds to officers at checkout. However, there were some older 40mm LLL carrying bags in circulation at Rampart Area in which contained up to five 40mm eXact iMPact rounds. This issue has since been corrected to checkout 40mm LLL carrying bags which include only three 40mm eXact iMPact rounds.

According to Officer Barrera, he advised the additional units at scene about the noise heard by Officer Yah Camara.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1834:38 hours, Sergeant B. Alfaro, Serial No. 38481, Rampart Area, Gang Enforcement Detail (GED), arrived at scene in response to the supervisor request. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara met with Sergeant Alfaro and briefed him on the incident, including a synopsis of the radio call, witness statements, and relationship between Vasquez and the witnesses. Officer Barrera informed Sergeant Alfaro that Vasquez was alone inside of a bedroom and when they attempted to open the door, Vasquez closed it on them. Officer Barrera advised Sergeant Alfaro that they had established verbal communication with Vasquez who stated that he would leave the location at 1900 hours. Officer Barrera described Vasquez' behavior as erratic and said he was armed with two metal poles. The officers also advised Sergeant Alfaro that, according to the witnesses, no crime had occurred (**Debriefing Point No. 5**).

Note: According to Sergeant Alfaro, he did not recall Officer Barrera mentioning that Vasquez was armed with two metal poles when he was briefed on the incident. Sergeant Alfaro stated he would have taken additional steps had he been aware that Vasquez was armed.⁷

The FID investigation revealed Officers Barrera and Yah Camara did not inform Sergeant Alfaro about the metallic sound resembling a sword being drawn from a sheath when they briefed him. Officer Barrera stated, "It had slipped my mind."

According to Officer Yah Camara, Sergeant Alfaro requested more information on if a crime had been committed by Vasquez. Officer Yah Camara again contacted the PR and witnesses and verified the information that was previously given to the officers. The information obtained revealed that *there was no crime*, the PR and witnesses wanted Vasquez removed from the location, and that the residents at the location *were in fear of Vasquez*.

According to Sergeant Alfaro, while Officer Yah Camara spoke with the PR, Sergeant Alfaro *attempted to speak to Vasquez through his bedroom door*. Upon speaking to Vasquez, Sergeant Alfaro believed Vasquez did not appear to be *very coherent or making sense*. Sergeant Alfaro believed that Vasquez was *either suffering from some type of mental illness or drug induced altered state of mind*. Sergeant Alfaro *reconvened with Officer Yah⁸ who informed him that the couple (Gutierrez and Padilla) did not want to press charges*. However, they were in fear for their safety at having Vasquez remain at the location. Sergeant Alfaro *made the determination that he, along with the officers at scene, would try to make contact with Vasquez and place Vasquez on a hold due to possible mental illness and being a danger to others*,

⁷ According to the FID investigator, Officer Yah Camara's BWV captured Officer Barrera briefing Sergeant Alfaro on the incident and stating Vasquez had been in possession of metal pipes. Sergeant Alfaro did not acknowledge, either verbally or via facial expression, that he heard Vasquez had been in possession of metal pipes.

⁸ During the course of the investigation, several personnel identified Officer Yah Camara as, "Officer Yah."

specifically the elderly couple (Gutierrez and Padilla) who resided at the location.⁹ *Prior to making contact with Vasquez, Sergeant Alfaro established a team and gave each officer there a role. Sergeant Alfaro designated Officer Barrera as the contact officer, Officer Yah Camara as the cover officer, Officer Nelson as the less-lethal force option, and Officers Williams and Carlson as the arrest team (Debriefing Point Nos. 5, 6, 7 and Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Tactical Communication and Effective Encounters with Mentally Ill Persons).*

According to Officer Barrera, at the direction of Sergeant Alfaro, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara approached the door to Vasquez' bedroom. Officer Barrera was assigned to open the door while Officer Yah Camara was his cover officer. As Officer Barrera *pulled* the door handle *very hard*, the door *opened, it cracked a bit*, and Officer Barrera observed Vasquez' hands *holding on to the doorknob and he pulled it, closed it right away*. Officer Barrera advised Vasquez that he was not *in trouble* and that the officers *wanted to get him some help*. Vasquez replied that the officers *were the one [sic] in trouble*.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1843:27 hours, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Barrera and Yah Camara to try opening the door again. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara switched roles making Officer Barrera become the Designated Cover Officer (DCO).

According to Officer Yah Camara, the first time he attempted to open Vasquez' bedroom door, Vasquez was holding on to it. Therefore, during this attempt, he pulled *harder*, which opened the door *all the way*. After opening the door, Officer Yah Camara walked backward, redeploying to the adjacent east bedroom. As he was *redeploying*, Officer Yah Camara drew his service pistol because Vasquez *was possibly armed with two metal pipes* and Officer Yah Camara believed *that at that point, there was like a substantial risk where deadly force may be justifiable (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Officer Barrera observed that Vasquez *was armed with a machete*, causing Officer Barrera to draw his service pistol. Officer Barrera redeployed backward and observed Vasquez *raise the machete and come out through the wedge of the door (Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Barrera's Third Occurrence)*.

According to Officer Nelson, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' door and Officer Barrera redeployed backward, Officer Nelson observed Vasquez *come out the door, holding a machete in each hand wearing a red shirt*. Officer Nelson stated that Vasquez *was holding the machete up, like at a readiness, like a downward striking motion*. Officer Nelson stated that *it looked like Vasquez was running out the door and advancing on the officers when he discharged his TASER (Less-Lethal Use of Force – TASER)*.

Note: The FID investigation determined that the TASER prongs did not make contact with Vasquez.

⁹ The hold would have been for Section 5150 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, Detention of Mentally Disordered Persons for Evaluation and Treatment

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez *immediately launch in the direction of Officer Yah Camara, while holding two machetes*. Officer Barrera observed Vasquez *wearing a red shirt, swing the machete using his left hand, in a forward, up-and-down motion in the direction of Officer Yah Camara, who was approximately three feet away*. Believing that Vasquez was *going to attack his partner with the machete and cause him serious injury*, Officer Barrera fired *approximately four or five rounds at Vasquez to stop the threat while assessing after each shot*. *After each round, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez was still up and doing the motion towards Officer Yah Camara (Lethal Use of Force – Officer Barrera's First Volley)*.

Note: During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that Officer Barrera fired six rounds from an approximate distance of eight feet. The time that elapsed between Round One and Round Six was approximately two seconds.

According to Officer Barrera, Vasquez *retreated back into the bedroom*. As Vasquez retreated, Officer Barrera ordered Vasquez to drop the machete. Approximately *half a second* later, Vasquez came back out in the direction of Officer Yah Camara while still having *control of the machetes*. Believing that Vasquez *could have seriously hurt his partner*, Officer Barrera fired two rounds at Vasquez to stop the threat. After the final round, Vasquez *dropped the machete and immediately closed the door (Lethal Use of Force – Officer Barrera's Second Volley)*.

Note: During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that approximately two seconds after Officer Barrera's First Volley, Officer Barrera fired two additional rounds from an approximate distance of seven feet. The time elapsed between Round Seven and Round Eight was approximately one second.

The total time elapsed between Round One and Round Eight was approximately five seconds.

According to Officer Williams, he drew his service pistol when Vasquez *came out of the room armed with two long sharp metal objects proceeding very quickly towards the officers*. Officer Williams believed that Vasquez would *commit serious bodily injury against one of the officers (Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Williams' Second Occurrence)*.

According to Officer Carlson, *as soon as Officer Barrera fired the rounds, she drew her service pistol because Vasquez was armed with machetes and deadly force would be a possibility (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Officer Barrera, he requested Officer Yah Camara to reposition himself from the adjacent bedroom to Officer Barrera's location. Officer Barrera also recommended to Sergeant Alfaro that rear containment be established *to secure Vasquez' bedroom window*.

According to Officer Yah Camara, he redeployed to where Officer Barrera and Sergeant Alfaro were positioned.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1843:51 hours, Sergeant Alfaro broadcast a help call, advising that shots were fired at 309 North Commonwealth Avenue. At approximately 1844:15 hours, Sergeant Alfaro requested a Rescue Ambulance (RA) for Vasquez. Sergeant Alfaro advised CD that Vasquez was barricaded in a room and armed with two machetes. Sergeant Alfaro advised the responding units to approach the location from either direction on Commonwealth Avenue.

According to Sergeant Alfaro, he directed Officer Carlson *to go to the street to direct other responding officers to the residence, since it was a second story sublet house.* Upon Officer Barrera's recommendation, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Nelson and Williams to *redeploy to the two-side (south side) of the house where Vasquez' bedroom window would be located.*

According to Officer Nelson, prior to leaving the residence and establishing rear containment of the location, Sergeant Alfaro additionally directed him to leave his 40mm LLL with the officers inside of the residence. Officer Nelson handed his 40mm LLL to Sergeant Alfaro (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Tactical Communication and 40mm LLL Manipulations**).

According to Officer Yah Camara, he momentarily holstered his service pistol after the OIS in order *to sling* the 40mm LLL given to him by Sergeant Alfaro. After slinging the 40mm LLL, he drew his service pistol again (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Yah Camara's Second Occurrence**).

According to Officer Williams, he and Officer Nelson went to *the driveway located on the south side of the house, where the suspect's window led to.* Officer Williams observed that the *suspect's window was open, blood was on the curtains, and observed a glimpse of the suspect's red shirt.* Using his handheld radio, Officer Williams broadcast *that the suspect was running northbound on the roof.*

According to Officer Carlson, when she heard an officer broadcast that Vasquez *was on the roof,* she looked up the driveway and observed Vasquez running at her. Based on her knowledge that Vasquez was *previously armed with a machete,* Officer Carlson drew her service pistol believing that Vasquez *still had the machete on him and was armed* (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Carlson's Second Occurrence**).

According to Officer Carlson, as Vasquez *closed the distance, he held both of his hands up* and Officer Carlson *could see his hands were empty.* Vasquez *turned and ran southbound on Commonwealth Avenue.* Officer Carlson *holstered* her weapon and engaged in a foot pursuit of Vasquez. Officer Carlson observed a *machete tucked in Vasquez' rear waistband* (**Debriefing Point Nos. 5 and 8**).

According to Officer Carlson, Vasquez *made his way into the parking lot of the 7-Eleven store* and was *running right at a group of approximately five or six people inside the store.* Believing that Vasquez *was going to arm himself with the machete and possibly do harm to those people,* Officer Carlson drew her service pistol and gave Vasquez *commands to drop the machete.* Officer Carlson drew her service pistol to, *if needed, use deadly force in order to preserve the lives of the citizens inside store.* Officer Carlson stated she holstered her service pistol after

Vasquez made entry into the store (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Carlson’s Third Occurrence**).

According to Officer Carlson, she along with approximately *three to four other officers* made entry into the store. Once Officer Carlson got eyes on Vasquez, Officer Carlson drew her service pistol to establish containment of Vasquez (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Carlson’s Fourth Occurrence**).

According to Officer Barrera, he observed that Vasquez was in possession of *the knife* and drew his service pistol because of Vasquez’ actions of *pacing back and forth* in the store (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Barrera’s Fourth Occurrence**).

According to Officer Williams, in an attempt to establish containment, Officer Williams drew his service pistol when he *first entered the 7-Eleven* because Vasquez was *still armed* and *posing a threat to officers*. Additionally, Officer Williams believed that Vasquez *could hurt* the officers *with his weapon* (**Drawing/Exhibiting – Officer Williams’ Third Occurrence**).

According to Officer Nelson, he observed *all the customers running out* of the store. Officer Nelson ran inside the store which consisted of *approximately five to six aisles* and observed officers holding individual aisles. Officer Nelson drew his service pistol to *hold the last aisle, closest to the door*. Officer Nelson drew his service pistol because Vasquez was *still armed with his machete* and Officer Nelson was designated as the lethal force option for the southernmost aisle (later identified as aisle one) (**Drawing/Exhibiting**).

According to Sergeant Alfaro, he along with the officers at scene successfully evacuated the store. Sergeant Alfaro *continued broadcasting* and provided the responding units updated information regarding the tactical situation. Sergeant Alfaro formulated a tactical plan where he *designated two officers per aisle to be lethal and less-lethal cover*.

According to the FID investigation, Officer A. Canales, Serial No. 38671, Rampart Patrol Division, arrived at the store in response to the *shots fired* broadcast and the subsequent *foot pursuit* heading towards *Virgil and Temple*.

According to Sergeant Alfaro, believing that he had *sufficient units inside* the store and wanting to mitigate potential issues *such as contagious fire*, Sergeant Alfaro advised the additional units arriving on scene to *hold* at the door of the store. As Vasquez was *pacing back and forth, still being armed with a knife*, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officer Yah to engage Vasquez with the 40-millimeter LLL.

According to Officer Yah Camara, Vasquez was *pacing back and forth, uncooperative* and non-compliant to commands given by *multiple officers* while Vasquez was *armed with the machetes*. Officer Yah Camara stated that Sergeant Alfaro directed the discharge of the 40mm LLL. In addition, Officer Yah Camara stated that Vasquez was *still armed with a possible knife in his waistband* and wanted to avoid using *lethal* force to take him into custody. Officer Yah

Camara was attempting to *de-escalate the situation* by discharging the 40mm LLL at Vasquez **(Debriefing Point No. 7 and Less-Lethal Use of Force – 40mm LLL)**.¹⁰

Note: The FID investigation determined Officer Yah Camara fired one 40mm round at Vasquez from an approximate distance of 23 feet. The round appeared to strike Vasquez on his left side.

According to Officer Canales, he observed that Vasquez *and the officers were inside the 7-Eleven*. Officer Canales entered *the 7-Eleven* and *noticed that a lot of officers had their guns drawn out*. Therefore, he *stayed with Officer Nelson, who was nearest to the entrance*. Officer Canales advised Officer Nelson that he *was behind Officer Nelson* and was equipped with a TASER. Officer Canales stated *Sergeant Alfaro* designated him less-lethal and designated Officer Nelson lethal. Sergeant Alfaro advised Officers Canales and Nelson *to hold their position down aisle one*.¹¹

According to Officer Canales, he observed Vasquez *walking back and forth at the other end of the aisle*. Vasquez was not *responding to the commands* and he *looked very agitated*. Vasquez was *sweating*. Vasquez was *looking around everywhere* and he *seemed a little confused*. Officer Canales stated that Vasquez, “*Didn’t know what was going on...or didn’t know what to do,*” which is the reason Officer Canales *tried to talk to him in Spanish several times*. Officer Canales believed that Vasquez did not speak English. Officer Canales *was trying to deescalate the situation and see if Vasquez could just calm down*.

According to Officer Yah Camara, he observed that Vasquez continued *moving back and forth*. Sergeant Alfaro again directed Officer Yah Camara to discharge the 40mm LLL for a second time. Officer Yah Camara discharged a second 40mm round *because the first one was ineffective, and the suspect was still pacing back and forth while being armed with a knife (Less-Lethal Use of Force – Second Discharge of 40mm LLL)*.

Note: The FID investigation determined Officer Yah Camara fired a second 40mm round at Vasquez from an approximate distance of 22 feet. The round appeared to strike Vasquez on his left side.

According to Officer Canales, Vasquez *hid behind the produce and all that stuff that they have down there*. Officer Canales *kept on talking to Vasquez and telling him in Spanish, “I wanna [sic] help you. We don’t want you to get hurt. Come out with your hands up.”* Officer Canales repeated the commands to Vasquez *about four or five times*.

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant Alfaro was cognizant of Vasquez’ background and was concerned about public safety and potential crossfire. Sergeant Alfaro directed Officer

¹⁰ The rounds fired by Officer Yah Camara’s 40mm LLL were 40 mm eXact iMPact rounds. They will be referred to as 40mm rounds for the remainder of this report.

¹¹ Force Investigation Division investigators determined that Officer Canales was inside the store and assigned as a less-lethal force option with Officer Nelson.

Solorio to reposition the exterior officers from the west side of the parking lot to the east side and to establish traffic control.¹² With the assistance of an Air Unit (Air 3), Officer Solorio shut down traffic for the nearby intersections. Sergeant J. Emerick, Serial No. 31560, Rampart Area, GED, arrived at the scene in response to the help call.

According to Sergeant Emerick, upon arrival at scene, he observed *various police units* and stated that it *appeared that the units at scene had a tactical plan in operation*. Sergeant Emerick *made contact with Sergeant Alfaro to see what he needed and also kind of viewed the ongoing scenario*.

According to the FID investigation, Sergeant Alfaro requested Sergeant Emerick to look through the exterior windows to see what Vasquez was doing. Sergeant Emerick was joined by Officer Lopez and together they walked toward the southwest corner of the 7-Eleven building. Officer Lopez looked through the window and observed Vasquez sitting on the floor and a knife behind the water bottles. Officer Lopez and Sergeant Emerick relayed their observations to Sergeant Alfaro, who relayed the information to the officers inside the store. Sergeant Alfaro directed Officer Solorio to request a ballistic shield.¹³

According to Sergeant Emerick, as he and Officer Lopez walked toward the southwest corner of the store to observe Vasquez' location, he drew his service pistol. Sergeant Emerick *drew his service pistol because the situation could have escalated to a use of deadly force not knowing if the suspect was armed with any potential firearms (Drawing/Exhibiting)*.

According to Sergeant Emerick, he declared himself as the *Incident Commander (IC)* via his handheld radio. Sergeant Emerick was *trying to work on the operations side of the incident* while Sergeant Alfaro *continued with the tactical side*. Sergeant Emerick *had Metro resources respond just as a standby to assist with the situation* and attempted to establish a Command Post (CP). Sergeant Emerick *directed resources to secure the OIS scene (Additional Tactical Debrief Topics – Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical UOF and Chief's Direction)*.

According to Sergeant Alfaro, *once traffic was stopped*, Sergeant Alfaro had a contact team *move up on the right side just to get better eyes on Vasquez*. Once the contact team moved up, officers were able to see Vasquez *sitting down* and eventually observed the location of the *knife*. Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Barrera, Williams, and Solorio to *approach and inconspicuously recover the knife*. Officer Barrera was designated as the less-lethal force option, Officer Williams was designated as the lethal force option, and Officer Solorio was assigned to recover the knife. The tactical team assigned to retrieve the knife did so by moving forward.

According to Officer Yah Camara, Vasquez was *just sitting down, being uncooperative*. Then at *one point, Vasquez just stands up* and Officer Yah Camara started giving Vasquez commands. Vasquez complied and was subsequently taken into custody without further incident.

¹² Officer R. Solorio, Serial No. 36103, Rampart Area, GED, arrived on scene in response to the help call.

¹³ Officer R. Lopez, Serial No. 41650, Rampart Area, GED, arrived on scene in response to the help call.

According to the FID investigation, at approximately 1901:35 hours, Sergeant Alfaro broadcast a Code Four stating that the suspect had been taken into custody.

Personnel from the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) arrived at scene, provided emergency medical treatment to Vasquez, and transported him to Los Angeles County, University of Southern California (LAC + USC) Medical Center for further treatment. Sergeant Alfaro took custody of the BWV cameras from Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, and Nelson. Sergeant Alfaro transferred custody of his BWV camera, along with Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, and Nelson's BWV cameras, to Sergeant Emerick.

Sergeant Emerick took custody of the 40mm LLL from Officer Yah Camara and secured it in his police vehicle. Sergeant Emerick obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS) from Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera, Yah Camara and Nelson.

Lieutenant J. Fleming, Serial No. 34772, Rampart Patrol Division, arrived at scene in response to the OIS and took over as the IC from Sergeant Emerick.

Lieutenant Fleming and Sergeant Emerick ensured the involved officers were separated and monitored until the arrival of additional supervision. Detective F. Marino, Serial No. 36439, Rampart Area, responded and obtained a PSS from Officers Williams and Carlson.¹⁴ Detective Marino separated and monitored Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Williams and Carlson, at scene. Detective Marino transported Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Williams and Carlson to Rampart CPS. Sergeant M. Solis, Serial No. 32316, Rampart Patrol Division, responded, separated and monitored Officer Barrera at scene. Sergeant Solis transported Officer Barrera to Rampart CPS. Detective C. Garcia, Serial No. 33611, Rampart Area, responded, separated and monitored Officers Nelson and Yah Camara at scene. Detective Garcia transported Officers Nelson and Yah Camara to Rampart CPS (**Additional/Equipment – Watch Commander's and Supervisor's Daily Reports**).

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Sergeants Alfaro and Emerick, along with Officers Barrera, Canales, Carlson, Nelson, Williams and Yah Camara.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Sergeant Emerick, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams and Yah Camara.

Less-Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Nelson and Yah Camara.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Barrera.

¹⁴ Detective Marino was a detective supervisor at the time of the incident.

ANALYSIS¹⁵

Detention

Officers Barrera and Yah Camara responded to a radio call of a 415 man (Vasquez), who was acting erratically, hallucinating, talking to himself, and raising his hand and lunging at the PR as if he was going to strike her. The PR believed Vasquez was possibly under the influence of a narcotic and was in fear for her safety. The PR requested to have Vasquez removed from the apartment. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara entered the residence and attempted to make verbal contact with Vasquez through his closed bedroom door. Vasquez' responses were incoherent. When Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Officer Barrera observed that Vasquez was holding what Officer Barrera perceived as two metal pipes or poles. Officer Barrera requested an additional unit and a supervisor. Additional officers and Sergeant Alfaro responded to the scene. The confined space of the residence placed the officers in close proximity to Vasquez' bedroom when attempting to make contact with him. Officers devised a tactical plan to make contact with Vasquez and determine if he met the criteria for a mental evaluation hold. When Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Vasquez emerged from the bedroom holding a machete in one hand and a large kitchen knife in the other hand. Vasquez lunged in the direction of Officer Yah Camara resulting in an OIS. The sergeants' and officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.
Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*

¹⁵ The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers Barrera and Yah Camara had previously discussed contact and cover roles, as well as lethal and non-lethal force options. Throughout the incident, the officers demonstrated their ability to pre-plan which began with Officers Barrera and Yah Camara. While they traded off between contact and cover roles when attempting to establish lines of communication with Vasquez, neither officer gave simultaneous commands. While one officer was speaking, the other took on the role of the cover officer. After Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door and Officer Barrera observed what he perceived to be metal poles or pipes in Vasquez' hands, the officers planned on waiting for additional resources.

Upon the arrival of additional resources, Officer Barrera outlined a tactical plan which included Officer Nelson as the designated less-lethal force option and Officers Carlson and Williams as the designated arrest team. Upon arrival, Sergeant Alfaro took over command and control, reaffirming the tactical plan established by Officer Barrera. After the OIS, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officer Carlson to go to the front of the location and assist in guiding the responding units to the residence. On the recommendation of Officer Barrera, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Nelson and Williams to establish containment to the rear of the residence. At the termination of the foot pursuit, Sergeant Alfaro advised officers to establish containment for each of the aisles inside the store. While inside the store, Sergeant Alfaro designated lethal and non-lethal force options for each aisle. In addition, Sergeant Alfaro formed a tactical team to retrieve the large kitchen knife that Vasquez had placed approximately six feet away from him and a separate contact team to take Vasquez into custody.

Assessment – Throughout the incident, officers assessed the actions of Vasquez. After observing what Officer Barrera perceived to be metal poles or pipes, the officers' assessment of the situation led to the request of additional resources. Officer Nelson, who was designated as the less-lethal force option, assessed the confined space of the location and opted to use the TASER over the 40mm LLL. During the OIS, Officer Barrera conducted an assessment after each round was fired. Subsequent to the OIS, Officer Barrera's assessment of the situation caused him to direct Officer Yah Camara to redeploy from the adjacent east bedroom to where the other officers were positioned. When Vasquez fled the location, Officer Carlson assessed that she was in the line of sight of other officers, thereby enabling her to engage in a foot pursuit. Upon arrival at the store, Officer Canales observed that there were multiple officers with their service pistols drawn, causing him to not go further inside of the store. Instead, he took a position behind Officer Nelson while equipped with a TASER in order to have lethal and less-lethal force options available.

Officers Barrera and Yah Camara assessed Vasquez posed a danger to Gutierrez and Padilla. They based their assessment on Gutierrez' statement that Vasquez had been acting erratically all day, hallucinating, and talking to himself. She believed Vasquez was possibly under the influence of narcotics. According to Gutierrez, Vasquez had additionally raised his hand and lunged at them, making movements as if he was going to hit them. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara had discussed the possibility of tactical disengagement, however, based on Vasquez' erratic behavior and possession of two poles, they believed Vasquez posed a danger to Gutierrez and Padilla. Officer Barrera stated he was concerned for Vasquez' mental state and wanted to detain him for a mental evaluation hold. According to Sergeant Alfaro, he also considered the concept of tactical disengagement, but did not find it to be a feasible option given the danger Vasquez posed to the other tenants of Gutierrez and Padilla, who occupied the residence with Vasquez.

Time – Officers Barrera and Yah Camara used time to their advantage. They made several attempts to make contact with Vasquez, through his bedroom door, prior to opening it. After observing that Vasquez was possibly armed with poles and closing his bedroom door, the officers contained him to the apartment and made repeated contacts with the PR and witnesses to gather additional information on Vasquez. They inquired if Vasquez had a history of mental illness or if he possessed any weapons. The officers also worked to determine if a crime had occurred. While at the store, the officers did not rush to take Vasquez into custody; instead, officers established containment and attempted to verbalize to Vasquez. Officers then used cover and time to their advantage, holding their positions in the store until vehicular and pedestrian traffic was stopped in an attempt to avoid any type of crossfire situation.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Officer Williams inquired about potential windows in Vasquez' bedroom considering the containment of the location. Immediately following the OIS, Officer Yah Camara redeployed from the adjacent bedroom to where the other officers were positioned, creating distance between himself and Vasquez. On the recommendation of Officer Barrera, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Nelson and Williams to establish rear containment of the location. While at the store, officers established containment in each of the aisles with lethal and non-lethal force options, as well as to the rear of the location.

The UOFRB noted that while Sergeant Alfaro later directed officers to the rear of the residence, it would have been preferable if containment was set earlier during the incident. By the time containment was being established, Vasquez had already exited out of his bedroom window and was running from the location.

Other Resources – Officer Barrera broadcast a request for an additional unit and a supervisor after observing Vasquez in possession of two possible metal poles. Upon his arrival, Officer Nelson retrieved and deployed a 40mm LLL, which the officers had available during the tactical operation. Subsequent to the OIS, Sergeant Alfaro broadcast the help call requesting additional units. While at the store, officers benefitted from having additional resources at scene which allowed them to establish containment on each aisle, as well as to form tactical teams for the retrieval of the knife and to take Vasquez into custody. Sergeant Alfaro was judicious with his use of those additional units, limiting the number of officers inside the 7-Eleven to a minimum.

On the recommendation of Officer Barrera, Sergeant Alfaro requested a ballistic shield to be utilized in taking Vasquez into custody. While inside of the store, officers used the surveillance cameras to their advantage and monitored the movements of Vasquez via the hanging surveillance monitors, which allowed officers to maintain distance between themselves and Vasquez. Sergeant Alfaro requested an RA unit for Vasquez. Los Angeles Fire Department personnel responded to the scene and staged nearby, prior to Vasquez being taken into custody. Sergeant Emerick requested the response of the Metropolitan Division's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to respond for a barricaded suspect with a knife.

Lines of Communication – Having learned from the PR that Vasquez was a Spanish speaker, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara gave Vasquez commands in Spanish and attempted to open lines of communication. When they were unable to solicit a response, officers varied their commands between Spanish and English in an attempt to gain compliance but were unsuccessful. The officers' compassion was demonstrated in their attempts to create a dialogue with Vasquez. Officer Barrera offered to help Vasquez and Officer Yah Camara offered Vasquez the opportunity to speak with a therapist. The active thought processes of Officers Barrera and Yah Camara were demonstrated through their consideration of tactical disengagement. Following the OIS, Officer Barrera verbally ensured that Officer Yah Camara was uninjured. Officers demonstrated clear lines of communication amongst each other at scene, as well as through their broadcasts, by updating responding units of the unfolding status of the incident. Multiple officers attempted to open lines of communication with Vasquez throughout the incident. While at the store, Sergeant Alfaro kept the officers informed of the forthcoming 40mm LLL discharge.

The UOFRB noted that neither Officer Barrera nor Officer Yah Camara advised Sergeant Alfaro of the sound that Officer Yah Camara had described as being consistent with a sword or knife being removed from a sheath. This information may have been beneficial to Sergeant Alfaro's planning during the incident.

The UOFRB noted, and I concur, that due to the rapidly unfolding nature of this incident, escalated by the deadly actions of Vasquez, the officers had limited time to react. Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara were required to make decisions that balanced the safety of the community, their own welfare, and the containment of a dangerous suspect followed by his apprehension.

During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:

Debriefing Point No. 1 Contact and Cover Roles

The contact officer is the officer initiating an action who becomes responsible for conducting the contact. The cover officer is the officer responsible for surveillance and control of a suspect in order to free the contact officer to perform a thorough investigation. Officer safety is a primary responsibility of all peace officers at all times. The contact officer should never rely solely on the cover officer for protection (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

Operational success is based on the ability of officers to effectively establish designated roles and communicate during critical incidents. Officers improve overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution.

In this case, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara switched the role of the contact officer back and forth while attempting to obtain a response from Vasquez. In addition, while Officer Yah Camara had a cover officer positioned down the hallway, he did not have a cover officer positioned next to him in the room adjacent while attempting to open Vasquez' outward opening bedroom door.

The UOFRB noted that Officers Barrera and Yah Camara's actions demonstrated their continued efforts to establish lines of communication with Vasquez and thus de-escalate the situation. The UOFRB noted the empathy demonstrated by the officers towards Vasquez and the officers' continued attempts to complete their investigation. The UOFRB would have preferred that one officer exercised the role of contact officer to eliminate possible confusion. In addition, the UOFRB considered the confined space of the location which limited the ability of the officers to deploy inside of the location.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Barrera and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 2 Barricaded Suspects

Incidents involving a barricaded suspect present significant safety concerns to first responders, the barricaded individual and the community. To ensure the safety of all involved, these volatile situations often require police to utilize not only special equipment and tactical training, but specific expertise in crisis negotiation. The Department's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team is equipped and trained to resolve incidents that involve a barricaded suspect.

Not all suspects who refuse to surrender are considered barricaded suspects necessitating a SWAT response. A barricaded suspect incident prompting a SWAT response may include, but is not limited to the following criteria:

- 1. The suspect is probably armed; and*
- 2. Probable cause exists to believe that the suspect has been involved in a criminal act or is a threat to the lives and safety of the community and/or police; and*
- 3. Is in a position of advantage, affording cover and/or concealment; or is contained in an open area and the presence or approach of police officers could precipitate an adverse reaction by the suspect; and*
- 4. The suspect refuses to submit to a lawful arrest.*

Handling barricaded suspects is one of the SWAT team's specific assignments. The SWAT team has a dual role at the scene of a barricaded suspect. They gather information to provide tactical recommendations and solutions to the IC who maintains overall responsibility of the incident. The SWAT team will also employ a tactical plan to capture the barricaded suspect at the IC's request. Once SWAT has been assigned its mission, all tactically deployed personnel shall be guided by the direction of SWAT supervisors.

Once the IC believes the incident meets the criteria for a barricaded suspect, the IC shall immediately contact Metropolitan Division's Watch Commander (WC) to request SWAT. The IC should be prepared to answer the who, what, why, when, where, and how questions needed to determine if SWAT's response is warranted (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLV, Issue 4, Barricaded Suspects – December 2016).

In this case, Officer Yah Camara pulled Vasquez' bedroom door open. After opening the door, Officer Yah Camara quickly redeployed to the doorway of the east bedroom. As the door opened, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez standing in the bedroom holding what he perceived to be two metal poles or pipes, one in each hand. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara did not recognize that they had a suspect who may have met the criteria for a barricaded suspect. Upon arrival at scene, Sergeant Alfaro was briefed by Officer Barrera regarding metal pipes in Vasquez' hands, however, Sergeant Alfaro did not contact Metropolitan Division's Watch Commander to request additional resources.

The UOFRB noted that when Officers Yah Camara and Barrera initially decided to open Vasquez' bedroom door and carried out their plan, they were not aware that Vasquez was armed. The officers had specifically asked the PR if Vasquez was in possession of any weapons and the PR replied that Vasquez was not. The PR wanted Vasquez to be evicted and the officers were attempting to keep the peace between both parties by making contact with Vasquez even though no crime was reported by the PR. The UOFRB considered that in order to meet the second prong of the barricaded suspect criteria, officers would have to establish that Vasquez was a threat to the lives and safety of the community and/or the police. To do so, officers would need to continue their investigation and make contact with Vasquez.

The UOFRB considered that the officers did not have information regarding Vasquez being armed or having access to weapons. The UOFRB also noted that there were no additional metal pipes or poles found at scene. The machete may have reasonably appeared larger in size when perceived by Officer Barrera.

The UOFRB concluded that the criteria for barricaded suspects was not met in this incident. However, the UOFRB would have preferred that on scene personnel contacted the Metropolitan Division Watch Commander for guidance and advice or to potentially enlist the assistance of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT).

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and

did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that the management of a possible barricaded suspect incident be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 3 Back-Up Request

This emergency call shall be broadcast when an officer requires additional units immediately, but the situation does not rise to the level where serious bodily injury, death or serious threat to public safety is imminent. The officer requesting shall include the location, followed by the unit designation and all other pertinent information, including the reason for the request (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).

In this case, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara did not request a back-up after Officer Barrera observed Vasquez standing in the bedroom holding what he believed were two metal poles or pipes, one in each hand. Instead, Officer Barrera requested for an additional unit and a supervisor for a "415 man."

The UOFRB noted that a back-up request would have been preferable to the additional unit request.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Barrera and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 4 Tactical Planning

Officers must approach every contact with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

In this case, Officers Barrera and Yah Camara did not wait for their additional units to arrive at scene prior to attempting to open Vasquez' bedroom door after observing the metal pipes or poles. In addition, Sergeant Alfaro along with Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, Nelson, Carlson, and Williams did not establish containment to the rear of the suspect location prior to the OIS.

The UOFRB considered that even though the officers appeared to be addressing a landlord/tenant dispute it would have been preferable to have an additional unit for rear containment. The UOFRB noted it would have preferred Officers Barrera and Yah Camara to have waited for the response of additional units prior to attempting to open the door for the second time. Immediately following the OIS, on the recommendation of Officer Barrera, Sergeant Alfaro directed Officers Nelson and Williams to establish rear containment.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officer Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 5 Tactical Communication

Officers are trained to work together and function as a team. In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training Learning, Domain 22).

Operational success is based on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. The officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their ability to recognize an unsafe situation and work collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

Upon arrival at scene, Sergeant Alfaro was briefed by Officer Barrera. Officer Barrera informed Sergeant Alfaro that Vasquez was in possession of two metal pipes. According to Officer Barrera, it slipped his mind to mention the noise heard by Officer Yah Camara which sounded like a sword or a knife being removed from a sheath.

In this case, Officer Carlson believed she broadcast that Vasquez was armed with a knife during the foot pursuit. However, a review of the CD audio and Officer Carlson's BWV recording did not capture her broadcast that Vasquez was armed. The FID investigation determined that at approximately 18:46:12 hours, Officer Carlson can be heard yelling at Vasquez to "Drop it, Drop the machete," in the presence of the first arriving back up unit at the store.

The UOFRB would have preferred that Officers Barrera and Yah Camara emphasized the perceived metal poles or pipes, as well as mentioned the sound heard, in their briefing to Sergeant Alfaro. Additionally, the UOFRB would have preferred that Officer Carlson broadcast information regarding the knife in Vasquez' possession while he fled the OIS scene. This incident rapidly escalated, was dynamic in nature and posed challenges to the involved officers.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Alfaro along with Officers Barrera, Carlson and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 6 Tactical Disengagement

Some situations require an immediate response, while others allow officers the opportunity to communicate with the subject, refine tactical plans, and, if necessary, call for additional resources.

Disengagement is the tactical decision to leave, delay contact, delay custody or plan to make contact at a different time and under different circumstances.

Tactical situations vary and there is no single solution to resolving every incident. Disengagement is only one of many tactics that should be considered, if feasible, to potentially reduce the intensity of the encounter if believed it would de-escalate the situation and no crime or a minor crime has occurred.

Tactical disengagement is one of the tactics that may be considered when an officer reasonably believes that continued contact may result in an unreasonable risk to the subject, the public, and/or Department members, especially in situations involving a barricaded suspect, a suicidal subject or a person believed to be experiencing a mental health crisis. Officers should continually assess the situation as circumstances change and new information is received (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVIII, Issue 5, Tactical Disengagement – July 2019).¹⁶

According to Officer Barrera, Gutierrez stated Vasquez had been acting erratically all day and believed he was under the influence of narcotics. She stated Vasquez had been hallucinating and talking to himself. According to Gutierrez, Vasquez had raised his hand and lunged at them, making movements as if he was going to hit them. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara discussed the possibility of tactical disengagement, however, based on Vasquez' erratic behavior and being in possession of two metal poles, they believed Vasquez posed a danger to Gutierrez and her husband. Officer Barrera stated he was concerned for Vasquez' mental state and wanted to detain him for a mental evaluation hold. According to Sergeant Alfaro, he also considered the concept of tactical disengagement, but did not find it to be a feasible option given the danger Vasquez posed to the other tenants of Gutierrez and Padilla, who occupied the residence with him.

The UOFRB noted that tactical disengagement was on the forefront of the officers' minds and was considered during the incident. The circumstances of this incident, which rapidly escalated by Vasquez, did not allow for the officers to utilize tactical disengagement to resolve the incident.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Alfaro's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

¹⁶ This source document was published on July 11, 2019.

Debriefing Point No. 7 Use of Force Warning

An officer shall, when feasible, give a verbal warning prior to using the TASER to control an individual. The warning is not required when an officer is attacked and must respond to the suspect's actions. Additionally, if a tactical plan requires the element of surprise to stabilize the situation, a warning is not required. Examples of this would be a hostage situation or a subject threatening suicide. However, officers are reminded that the surprise/tactical element must still be needed at the actual time the TASER is fired.

The verbal warning should include a command and a warning of potential consequences of the use of force. The command should be similar to "drop the weapon" or "stop what you are doing" followed by a warning similar to "or we may use the TASER, and that may cause you injury" (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 4.5, Electronic Control Device, TASER – July 2018).

An officer shall, when feasible, give a verbal warning prior to using the 40mm LLL to control an individual. The warning is not required when an officer is attacked and must respond to the suspect's actions. Additionally, if a tactical plan requires the element of surprise to stabilize the situation, a warning is not required. Examples of this would be a hostage situation or a subject threatening suicide. However, officers are reminded that the surprise/tactical element must still be needed at the actual time the 40mm LLL is fired.

The verbal warning should include a command and a warning of potential consequences of the use of force. The command should be similar to "drop the weapon" or "stop what you are doing" followed by a warning similar to "or we may use the 40mm, and that may cause you injury" (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 17, 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher – July 2018).

In this case, Officer Nelson did not provide a less-lethal verbal warning prior to the TASER application on Vasquez. According to Officer Nelson, he did not provide a verbal warning because Vasquez was attacking the officers and Officer Nelson was reacting to Vasquez' actions. Officer Nelson reacted immediately to Vasquez' violent actions by discharging the TASER in order to stop his advance with the machetes on the officers. A TASER warning was not feasible given the hasty violent assault by Vasquez.

The UOFRB noted that with his discharge of the TASER, Officer Nelson was responding to Vasquez who was armed with a machete in one hand and a knife in the other while he was moving towards the officers.

Officer Yah Camara did not provide a less-lethal verbal warning prior to the 40mm LLL discharges. According to Officer Yah Camara, he did not give a verbal warning because multiple officers were already giving Vasquez commands to which Vasquez was being non-compliant. In addition, due to Vasquez pacing back and forth, giving Vasquez a warning would have put Officer Yah Camara in a tactically disadvantageous position.

In its review of the 40mm LLL discharges, the UOFRB considered that Vasquez was given a partial warning which fulfilled the “command” portion of the requirement.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officers Nelson and Yah Camaras’ actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Debriefing Point No. 8 Apprehension vs. Containment Mode

***Apprehension versus Containment:** There are two pursuit modes officers may use when a suspect flees on foot, apprehension mode or containment mode. Some factors that will influence an officer’s decision to operate in the apprehension or containment mode are the suspect’s actions, officer’s experience, training, physical fitness level, location and available resources.*

During apprehension mode, officers work as a team, pursue and attempt to overtake a fleeing suspect until apprehending the suspect, making the decision to discontinue the foot pursuit or transition into containment mode. The pursuing officers should assess and communicate with each other before deciding on a course of action.

Officers may make the decision to discontinue a foot pursuit when the tactical situation deteriorates, either officer becomes injured, or effective communication ability is lost (lost or broken radio or dead spot) or at either officers’ discretion. If either of the pursuing officers feels it necessary to end the pursuit, he/she must alert the partner officer quickly to avoid separation.

Generally, officers are discouraged from pursuing armed suspects on foot. Nonetheless, officers must be afforded a level of discretion regarding the appropriateness of their decision to engage in foot pursuit of an armed suspect.

If the suspect is no longer in sight or enters a structure such as a house, apartment or business, or gains a tactical advantage, officers may make the decision to continue the pursuit in containment mode while coordinating the response of additional units to establish a perimeter. Containing a suspect in a specific area can decrease the opportunity for an ambush and will make it more likely that the suspect will be taken into custody.

When the decision is made to establish a perimeter, officers should act quickly to prevent the suspect’s escape and broadcast the following:

- *General location of an incident command post (the end of pursuit location). This location can be moved later.*
- *Boundaries for the perimeter. Remember it is easier to decrease a perimeter than increase one. Initially, even general locations or instructions will suffice. (e.g. 2 blocks to South and North, 2 blocks to East and West of my location).*

- *Request for air unit to assist in establishing or adjusting the perimeter. The presence of the air unit will also encourage the suspect(s) to remain within the perimeter.*
- *Request a supervisor and the necessary resources to safely handle the incident (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).*

Pursuing Armed Suspects: *When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. The decision to pursue an armed suspect in apprehension mode may be appropriate when the suspect is at a tactical disadvantage and an arrest can be accomplished with limited risk to officers or innocent parties (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).*

Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara engaged in a foot pursuit of Vasquez, whom they believed was armed with a machete and presented an immediate danger to the community.

Containment of an armed suspect demands optimal situational awareness. The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution.

In this case, Officer Carlson initiated the foot pursuit because she observed that Vasquez was armed with a machete and wanted to maintain a visual of him. Officer Carlson maintained a line of sight to other officers who were also in close proximity to render immediate aid, if needed. The officers in her line of sight included the officers engaged in the foot pursuit with her, as well as an additional unit responding to the help call. Vasquez was running from a residence and ultimately entered into a store which was occupied by numerous persons.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeant Alfaro along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara's actions were reasonable and did not deviate from approved Department tactical training. In order to enhance future performance, I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Effective Encounters with Mentally Ill Persons – The investigation revealed that Sergeant Alfaro, along Officers Barrera and Yah Camara, heard Vasquez talking to himself and speaking incoherently. This behavior could be consistent with a person suffering from mental illness and/or being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, which led Officers Yah Camara and Barrera to inquire with the residents of the location if Vasquez had any history mental illness. The residents advised they were unaware that Vasquez suffered from any mental illness. Sergeant

Alfaro along with Officers Barrera and Yah Camara implemented their plan to detain Vasquez for a mental evaluation hold, with the intent to contact the Department's Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) after detaining Vasquez. Sergeant Alfaro along with Officers Barrera and Yah Camara are reminded of the resources available when encountering persons suffering from mental illness, including contacting MEU, for guidance as well as background information of the subject. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Required Equipment – The investigation revealed that Officer Nelson was not equipped with his side-handle baton. Officer Nelson left his side-handle baton in his police vehicle during the incident. As such, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Tactical Communication – The investigation revealed that while Sergeant Alfaro assumed the duties of an Incident Commander, he did not declare himself as such. The declaration of the role of the Incident Commander can reduce confusion during the management of an incident.

The investigation revealed that Officer Nelson did not advise Sergeant Alfaro of the condition of the loaded 40mm LLL upon transferring it to him prior to exiting the residence to establish rear containment. Being unaware of the condition of the 40mm LLL could increase the probability of an unintentional discharge of the launcher.

Sergeant Alfaro and Officer Nelson are reminded of the importance of effective communication during a tactical incident to reduce possible confusion and improve operational success. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

40mm Less-Lethal Launcher (LLL) Manipulations – The investigation revealed that Officer Nelson loaded one round into the chamber of the 40mm LLL at his start of watch, prior to securing it into his police vehicle. Officer Nelson is reminded of the storage and transportation guidelines relevant to the 40mm LLL. The storage of a preloaded 40mm LLL may increase the probability of an unintentional discharge. I will direct that this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force - The investigation revealed that Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera and Yah Camara left the OIS scene unsecured in order to engage in a foot pursuit of Vasquez. The OIS scene was left unsecured for approximately eight minutes. According to Officer Yah Camara, he left the apartment because he heard fellow officers making contact with Vasquez and was concerned for officer safety, as well as the apprehension of Vasquez. While this incident involved a rapidly escalating and dynamic situation, personnel are reminded that the preservation of a crime scene, especially one related to an OIS, is imperative to maintain an accurate investigation. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

The investigation revealed that Sergeant Alfaro utilized officers involved in the OIS in the subsequent tactical operations, which ultimately resulted in an additional less lethal UOF. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

The investigation revealed that at the conclusion of the incident, Officer Nelson removed the wires from his TASER cartridge and discarded them in the store parking lot. The preservation of evidence is an important aspect of a complete and transparent investigation. I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII, Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Los Angeles Police Department, Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, Emergency Operations Guide).

Officer Barrera was the senior officer of the primary unit. Prior to the arrival of Sergeant Alfaro, Officer Barrera briefed the additional units at scene and established a tactical plan designating Officer Nelson as the less-lethal force option, and Officers Carlson and Williams as the arrest team. In addition, immediately following the OIS, Officer Barrera recommended to Sergeant Alfaro that rear containment be established.

The actions of Officer Barrera were consistent with Department training and met my expectations of a senior officer at scene during a critical incident.

Sergeant Alfaro arrived at scene in response to the supervisor request. Upon arrival, Sergeant Alfaro was briefed by the primary unit. Sergeant Alfaro designated lethal and non-lethal force options, as well as an arrest team, as part of the tactical plan to detain Vasquez for 5150 WIC, danger to others. After the OIS, Sergeant Alfaro directed officers to the rear for containment and to guide additional resources into the location. Sergeant Alfaro engaged in foot pursuit of Vasquez, along with the officers to maintain command and control of the incident. While at the store, Sergeant Alfaro established tactical plans for containment of the incident, retrieval of Vasquez' weapons, and the taking of Vasquez into custody. Additionally, Sergeant Alfaro directed the discharges of 40mm LLL rounds. Subsequent to Vasquez being taken into custody and the termination of the tactical incident, Sergeant Alfaro took custody of the BWV cameras from Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, and Nelson. Sergeant Alfaro transferred custody of his BWV camera, along with Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, and Nelson's BWV cameras to Sergeant Emerick.

Sergeant Emerick arrived at scene in response to the help call. Upon arrival, Sergeant Emerick met with Sergeant Alfaro and inquired as to where he needed assistance. At the request of Sergeant Alfaro, Sergeant Emerick took a position outside the store in order to observe Vasquez' actions. Sergeant Emerick relayed the information obtained regarding the position of Vasquez and the knife to Sergeant Alfaro. Sergeant Emerick ensured that officers blocked traffic in order to avoid potential crossfire. Sergeant Emerick declared himself as the IC via his handheld radio and broadcast a request for Metropolitan Division resources. Sergeant Emerick established a CP and obtained a PSS from Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera, Yah Camara, and Nelson. Sergeant Emerick took custody of the 40mm LLL from Officer Yah Camara and secured it in his police vehicle. Sergeant Emerick ensured the separation and monitoring of involved officers until the arrival of additional supervision.

In its deliberations, the UOFRB noted that in his management of this complex scene, Sergeant Alfaro had control of the incident, a clear delineation of roles for personnel, and limited the potential for the use of lethal force. Sergeant Alfaro was clear in his communication and directions.

The actions of Sergeants Alfaro and Emerick were overall consistent with Department supervisory training and my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Sergeant N. Driller, Serial No. 33553, Rampart Patrol Division, was the watch commander at the time of the incident; however, he did not respond to the scene.¹⁷

Lieutenant Fleming arrived at the location in response to the OIS and took over as Incident Commander responsibilities. Lieutenant Fleming ensured the separation and monitoring of involved officers until the arrival of additional supervision.

¹⁷ During the UOFRB, Captain Gonzalez presented that Lieutenant Fleming had coordinated with and advised Sergeant Driller that Lieutenant Fleming would respond to the scene at the completion of roll call.

In reviewing this incident, the UOFRB was critical of Sergeant Driller's lack of response and Lieutenant Fleming's delayed response to the scene. The incident was dynamic and involved a mobile suspect who moved from an initial location to an additional location after the OIS occurred. The UOFRB emphasized the Department's expectation that the watch commander should respond to a critical incident such as this. Furthermore, Sergeant Driller's lack of response and Lieutenant Fleming's delayed response created an undue burden on Sergeant Alfaro at scene.

The actions of Sergeant Driller and Lieutenant Fleming, while not a substantial deviation from Department supervisory training, are worthy of specific discussion with them along with the expectations of the command regarding supervisory responsiveness. In an effort to improve future performance, I will direct Sergeant Driller and Lieutenant Fleming to attend the Tactical Debrief and that Command and Control be a topic of discussion.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Sergeants Alfaro and Emerick, along with Officers Barrera, Canales, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara's tactics did not deviate from approved Department tactical training.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were areas identified where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct that Sergeants Alfaro and Emerick, along with Officers Barrera, Canales, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics be discussed.

Additionally, although it was determined that Lieutenant Fleming and Sergeant Driller were not substantially involved in this incident and did not receive formal findings, they would benefit from attending the Tactical Debrief. To enhance future performance, I am directing that Lieutenant Fleming and Sergeant Driller also attend the Tactical Debrief.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control;
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On July 25th, 2019, Sergeant Alfaro, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered in addition to Barricaded Suspects and Mentally Ill Persons.

Drawing/Exhibiting

Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *"An officer's decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer's reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified"* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80)

Officer Barrera

First Occurrence

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, it opened approximately a foot and a half. While standing approximately 10 to 11 feet away, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez wearing a red shirt and what Officer Barrera believed to be two metal poles, one in each hand. Officer Barrera drew his service pistol because he saw that Vasquez was armed with two objects and Officer Yah Camara was in close proximity to Vasquez, approximately three feet away. Officer Barrera believed that Vasquez was going to be "unpredictable" and attack his partner and cause serious bodily injury. Officer Barrera recalled,

My partner was in the front. He had a closer view. Maybe he heard something that I didn't. He ... checked the doorknob, it was unlocked, and he tried to open it. It opened. It cracked maybe a foot and a half. That's when I saw the suspect male Hispanic rearing [sic] a red [sic] shirt. And what I observed was two metal like poles, one in each hand. But I was maybe feet, 11 feet, 10 feet away ... Well, when he opened the door, what I believed to be two metal poles ... in each hand ... As soon ... as I clearly see the ... two objects in his hand, I unholster because my partner is very, very close ... I think when ... my partner heard me say hey, drop what you have in your hands, my partner quickly backed up to the other room. And I unholstered just because the tight space, and I didn't know if the suspect was going to approach my partner or not. But then he closes ... the door right away.¹⁸

The reason I unholstered my pistol was because I saw the suspect armed with two objects where I reasonably believed were two metal pipes. And then my partner was maybe three feet away from him after he opened the door. And I believed that the suspect ... from the comments of the radio call, he's already hallucinating. Residents are in fear for their safety.

¹⁸ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 24, Lines 23-25; Page 25, Lines 1-5, 12-13 and 16-24

I thought he was going to be unpredictable and attack my partner and cause serious bodily injury.¹⁹

Second Occurrence

After Officer Barrera observed Vasquez in possession of two possible metal poles, Officer Yah Camara asked Officer Barrera to inquire with the witnesses as to whether Vasquez suffered from a mental illness. Officer Barrera agreed. Officer Barrera holstered his pistol and walked out of the residence, followed by Officer Yah Camara. Witness Padilla advised the officers that Vasquez did not suffer from a mental illness. Officers Barrera and Yah Camara walked back into the residence. Officer Yah Camara knocked on Vasquez' bedroom door and continued to verbalize with Vasquez. While waiting for additional units to arrive Officer Yah Camara advised Officer Barrera that he was going to open Vasquez' door. Officer Barrera advised Officer Yah Camara that he would provide cover and advised Officer Yah Camara to back into the east bedroom once the door was open. Officer Yah Camara opened the door and redeployed into the east bedroom. As the DCO, Officer Barrera drew his pistol, stepped to the left, and utilized the east hallway wall as cover.²⁰

Third Occurrence

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Officer Barrera drew his service pistol after observing that Vasquez was armed with machetes. Officer Barrera redeployed backwards and observed Vasquez raise a machete and come out through the "wedge of the door."

Officer Barrera recalled,

After ... that, about 15, maybe 10 seconds, ... my partner and I switch. So he gives it an attempt and so I go back to where he's at. He tries to pull and the door pops up, opens. That's when I see the suspect armed with a machete so I redeploy back. And I see my partner backing up right away. And I see the suspect raise the machete, comes out through the wedge of the door fully and ... I drew out as soon as I saw the machetes.²¹

Fourth Occurrence

According to Officer Barrera, he observed Vasquez in possession of the knife and drew his service pistol because of Vasquez' actions of pacing back and forth in the store.

¹⁹ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 26, Lines 16-24

²⁰ Officer Barrera did not address this occurrence in his interview, however it was addressed in the FID investigation that Officer Barrera drew service pistol after the discussion between Officers Barrera and Yah Camara that Officer Barrera would be the cover officer.

²¹ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 45, Lines 11-18 and 23

Officer Barrera recalled,

And when I got to the 7-11, I did draw my weapon again ... because the suspect's actions was pacing back and forth.²²

I saw the knife and he kept pacing back and forth from the aisles.²³

Officer Yah Camara

First Occurrence

According to Officer Yah Camara, he drew his service pistol after he opened Vasquez' bedroom door. Officer Barrera had already advised him that Vasquez was possibly armed with two metal pipes. As Officer Yah Camara opened the door, Officer Yah Camara redeployed backwards toward the room adjacent to Vasquez' bedroom. As he was redeploying, Officer Yah Camara drew his service pistol because Vasquez was possibly armed with two metal pipes and Officer Yah Camara believed at that point, there was a substantial risk where deadly force may be justifiable.

Officer Yah Camara recalled,

At that point, since the first time I tried, I was like, "He's holding it." I was thinking, ... I'm going to pull harder. As soon as I pull, the door opens all the way, I redeployed to the other room ... as I'm redeploying, walking backwards, I unholstered my weapon.²⁴ And as I'm like redeploying, I'm unholstered, because at that point, based on what we knew about the suspect at that point, my partner advised me that he was possibly armed with metal pipes. I believe that at that point, there was like a substantial risk ... where deadly force may be ... justifiable.²⁵

Second Occurrence

According to Officer Yah Camara, he momentarily holstered his service pistol after the OIS in order to sling the 40mm LLL given to him by Sergeant Alfaro. After slinging the 40mm LLL, Officer Yah Camara drew his service pistol once again.

Officer Yah Camara recalled,

Sergeant Alfaro wanted a unit to the rear ... And Officer Nelson went to the rear with Officer Williams and his partner. At that point, he handed me his 40. I holstered to sling the 40, and I unholstered again.²⁶

²² Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 73, Lines 2-3 and 5-6

²³ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 75, Lines 8-9

²⁴ Officer Yah Camara, First Interview, Page 13, Lines 18-23

²⁵ Officer Yah Camara, First Interview, Page 28, Lines 16-22 and 24

²⁶ Officer Yah Camara, First Interview, Page 29, Lines 22, 24-25 and Page 30, Lines 1-2

Officer Nelson

According to Officer Nelson, he observed customers running out of the store. Officer Nelson ran inside the store which consisted of approximately five to six aisles and observed officers holding individual aisles. Officer Nelson drew his service pistol to hold the aisle one, closest to the door. Officer Nelson drew his service pistol because Vasquez was still armed with his machete and Officer Nelson was designated as the lethal force option for aisle one.

Officer Nelson recalled,

By the time I get there, all the customers inside were running out. We run inside ... there's about, I'd say, approximately five aisles, five to six aisles. Everyone is holding an aisle. I pull out my gun. I hold the last aisle, closest to the door ... at this point, he's still armed with his machete, so the sergeant say [sic], "Just hold on him." If he comes, I was assigned to be lethal if he comes my way.²⁷

Officer Carlson

First Occurrence

According to Officer Carlson, as soon as Officer Barrera fired rounds, Officer Carlson drew her service pistol because Vasquez was armed with machetes and deadly force would be a possibility.

Officer Carlson recalled,

When I heard the gunshots go off I was holstered at that point but as soon as he fired the rounds I unholstered my weapon, finger alongside the frame at a low ready just because at that point based on his statements I knew suspect was armed with machetes and that deadly force would be a possibility.²⁸

Second Occurrence

According to Officer Carlson, when she heard an officer broadcast that Vasquez was on the roof, she looked up the driveway and observed Vasquez running at her. Based on her knowledge that Vasquez was previously armed with a machete, Officer Carlson drew her service pistol believing that Vasquez still had the machete on him and was armed.

Officer Carlson recalled,

I heard him put out over the air ... the suspect was on the roof. At that point, I look up the driveway. I see the male ... matching the description that the primary unit gave me running

²⁷ Officer Nelson, Page 9, Lines 7-12, 25 and Page 10, Lines 1-3

²⁸ Officer Carlson, Page 9, Lines 1-6

at me. I unholstered my weapon, finger alongside the frame, a low ready just because I knew that previously he was armed with a machete so I believe that he still had the machete on him and was armed.²⁹

Third Occurrence

According to Officer Carlson, Vasquez made his way into the parking lot of the store and ran at a group of people inside the store. Believing that Vasquez was going to arm himself with the machete and possibly do harm to those people, Officer Carlson drew her service pistol and gave Vasquez commands to drop the machete. Officer Carlson drew her service pistol to, if needed, use deadly force in order to preserve the lives of the citizens inside of the store.

Officer Carlson recalled,

And then he made ... his way into the parking lot of the 7-Eleven. And at that point ... the way he was running ... he was running right at -- I could see there was like a group of five or six people inside. He was running right for the door and I believed he was going to arm himself with the machete and possibly do harm to those people. So, at that point I unholstered again. I gave him commands ... to drop the machete. He ... made his way inside. I holstered again and then put out over the air that we were at the 7-Eleven.³⁰

As soon as I saw that he was closing the distance towards the front door of the 7-Eleven and I could tell that was ... his intention was to go inside and I saw the group of people and like I said he had the machete right behind his back. And just the way he was moving I thought he was going to arm himself with the machete and try to hurt the people that are inside ... so for me, drawing my weapon was to try to if I needed to use deadly force in order to preserve their lives so he wasn't able to hurt anyone else.³¹

Fourth Occurrence

According to Officer Carlson, she along with approximately three to four other officers made entry into the store. Once Officer Carlson observed Vasquez, she drew her service pistol to establish containment of him.

Officer Carlson recalled,

And that [sic] myself and I believe it was like three to four other officers we made entry. And then once I got eyes on him again and held him ... I unholstered at that point.³²

²⁹ Officer Carlson, Page 9, Lines 21-25 and Page 10, Lines 1-3

³⁰ Officer Carlson, Page 10, Lines 13-23

³¹ Officer Carlson, Page 24, Lines 13-23

³² Officer Carlson, Page 10, Lines 23-25 and Page 11, Line 1

Officer Williams

First Occurrence

According to Officer Williams, he drew his service pistol while clearing the room adjacent to Vasquez' bedroom because Officer Williams believed that he might come in contact with an armed suspect and needed to be able to protect himself.

Officer Williams recalled,

I checked the room to the right when we first entered to the right where the suspect was to make sure it was clear. And at that point I unholstered my weapon when I was clearing the room. It was clear. Then I re-holstered my weapon.³³

Because we didn't know if there was somebody -- if the suspect could have entered into that side room. And at that point, we have an armed suspect, so I unholstered, you know, because I thought ... I might come in contact with an armed suspect, needed to be able to protect myself.³⁴

Second Occurrence

According to Officer Williams, he drew his service pistol after Vasquez came out of his bedroom armed with two long sharp metal objects, proceeding quickly toward officers. Officer Williams believed that Vasquez would commit serious bodily injury against one of the officers.

Officer Williams recalled,

When Officer Ya [sic] opened the door, and the suspect came out armed with two long sharp metal objects, came towards Officer Barrera, in which he was already unholstered, and he fired approximately four rounds. At that point, I was standing kind of behind him to the left in small quarters. I unholstered, but I did not draw out. I immediately re-holstered, because there was no way for me to unholster without covering one of the other officers in the room.³⁵

... when the suspect came out with the metal object, I was standing behind -- to the side of Officer Barrera. And then ... I unholstered with my right hand. I pulled it out of my holster, and then I put it back in because ... I couldn't take it out without covering somebody ... I unholstered my gun, completely took it out of my holster and it was pointed at the ground with one hand, and then I put it back in my holster.³⁶

³³ Officer Williams, Page 7, Lines 16-20

³⁴ Officer Williams, Page 17, Lines 1-6

³⁵ Officer Williams, Page 8, Lines 18-25 and Page 9, Lines 1-2

³⁶ Officer Williams, Page 19, Lines 23-25; Page 20, Lines 1-3 and 11-14

The suspect came out of the room ... holding two knives proceeding towards us very quickly, and I believed that he was going to try and commit serious bodily injury against one of the officers. So ... my plan was to draw (inaudible).³⁷

Third Occurrence

According to Officer Williams, he drew his service pistol when he first entered the store. He was attempting to contain Vasquez because Vasquez was still armed and posing a threat to officers. Additionally, Officer Williams believed that Vasquez could hurt the officers with his weapon.

Officer Williams recalled,

... for the third time I unholstered when we first entered the 7-Eleven and ... we had him, you know, contained in there. ... Because he was still armed posing a threat ... to us, to officers and myself... That he could hurt us with his weapon.³⁸

Sergeant Emerick

According to Sergeant Emerick, he was directed by Sergeant Alfaro to position himself and observe Vasquez from the exterior of the store and verbally relay Vasquez' activity. Sergeant Emerick drew his service pistol because the situation could have escalated to a use of deadly force, not knowing if the suspect was armed with any potential firearms.

Sergeant Emerick recalled,

I went to the area where he said the suspect was pinned down and I removed my gun from the holster just in case the situation could have escalated to a use of deadly force just to get a quick eyes on to see where the suspect was.³⁹

I also removed my firearm on the approach not knowing if the suspect was armed with any potential firearms.⁴⁰

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of Sergeant Emerick's, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB conducted a diligent and individual assessment of each officer's articulation regarding their decision to draw their service pistols and noted that Vasquez' actions presented a potential deadly threat to the community as well as the officers. The UOFRB considered that for each occurrence of drawing their service pistols, the officers had a reasonable belief that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

³⁷ Officer Williams, Page 21 Lines 4-8

³⁸ Officer Williams, Page 35, Line 25; Page 26, Lines 1-2, 4-5 and 8-9

³⁹ Sergeant Emerick, Page 7, Lines 4-8

⁴⁰ Sergeant Emerick, Page 10, Lines 13-15

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Sergeant Emerick, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, I find Sergeant Emerick's, along with Officers Barrera, Carlson, Nelson, Williams, and Yah Camara's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General⁴¹

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*

⁴¹ Special Order No. 4, 2020 – Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Less-Lethal Use of Force

It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10).*

Whenever practicable, officers shall exercise de-escalation techniques to resolve potential use of force incidents and seek voluntary compliance from suspects/subjects.

The courts have held that Less-Lethal force options are "capable of inflicting significant pain and may cause serious injury." Therefore, consistent with the Department's Use of Force Policy, Less-Lethal force options are only permissible when:

- *An officer reasonably believes the suspect or subject is violently resisting arrest or poses an immediate threat of violence or physical harm.*

Less-Lethal force options shall not be used for a suspect or subject who is passively resisting or merely failing to comply with commands. Verbal threats of violence or mere non-compliance by a suspect do not alone justify the use of Less-Lethal force.

An officer may use the TASER as a reasonable force option to control a suspect when the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.

The optimal range for the TASER is 7-15 feet. This range gives the most effective spread of the probes to accomplish NMI [Neuro-Muscular Incapacitation] (Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 4.5, Electronic Control Device, TASER – July 2018).

An officer may use the 40mm Less Lethal Launcher as a reasonable force option to control a suspect when the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.

The minimum recommended deployment range for the 40mm Less Lethal Launcher is five feet, while the effective deployment range is up to 110 feet (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force Tactics Directive No. 17, 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher – July 2018).

Officer Nelson – TASER, one four-second activation in probe-mode, from an approximate distance of nine feet.

According to Officer Nelson, he observed Officer Yah Camara open Vasquez' bedroom door and Vasquez come out of the door holding a machete in each hand. Officer Nelson was next to Officer Barrera, as he redeployed backward. Officer Nelson observed Vasquez holding the machete up, in a position of "readiness." Officer Nelson stated he believed Vasquez was running out of the door and advancing on the officers when he discharged his TASER.

Officer Nelson recalled,

And then Ya [sic] opens the door, and then ... Barrera backs up to the end of the hallway, and then I'm next to him ... on the left... The suspect comes out the door. I see him holding a machete in each hand wearing a red shirt. It looks like he's running out the door. That's when I shoot my Taser. He was about, I'd say, eight feet away.⁴²

He had them up and advancing on us... he's holding it up, like at a readiness, like a downward striking motion would be how he would use it.⁴³

Officer Yah Camara – 40mm Less-Lethal Launcher

First Discharge, one 40mm round from an approximate distance of 23 feet.

According to Officer Yah Camara, Vasquez was pacing back and forth inside the store. Vasquez was uncooperative and non-compliant to commands given by multiple officers. Officer Yah Camara knew Vasquez had been armed with machetes at the apartment and was advised by officers that Vasquez was possibly armed with a knife in the store. Officer Yah Camara stated that Sergeant Alfaro also directed the discharge of the 40mm LLL. In addition, Officer Yah Camara stated that Vasquez was still armed with a possible knife in his waistband and wanted to avoid using lethal force to take him into custody. Officer Yah Camara was attempting to de-escalate the situation by discharging the 40mm LLL.

Officer Yah Camara recalled,

At that point, we see the -- I -- the suspect pacing back and forth, uncooperative, multiple officers ... giving him commands. At that point, I'm assigned to less lethal. I'm assigned the 40. It was the only 40 we had ... at scene. I checked the 40. One round was ... in the chamber. At that point, ... I announce myself that the 40-millimeter is ready. And Sergeant Alfaro behind me gave me the command to deploy the 40 to attempt to stop the suspect ... the suspect's moving back and forth so ... I didn't have a good shot, and I announce, like I tell him, "I don't have a shot due to the aisles covering him." ... At one point, he comes out, and then ... I deploy the 40, hitting him in the stomach area. Ineffective.⁴⁴

⁴² Officer Nelson, Page 7, Lines 22-25 and Page 8, Lines 2-6

⁴³ Officer Nelson, Page 20, Lines 22-23 and Page 21, Lines 16-18

⁴⁴ Officer Yah Camara, First Interview, Page 15, Lines 19-25; Page 16, Lines 1-7 and 9-11

He was armed with the machetes and then obviously at the 7-Eleven officers advised ... he was still armed with a possible knife in his waistband ... at that point, I was afraid that we were going to use lethal to apprehend the suspect which I wanted to avoid ... by deploying the 40-millimeter and take him into custody.⁴⁵

Based on training and experience dealing with suspects pacing back and forth at that point his demeanor is telling me that he's either thinking of something to do or at that point he's just quick charge at us while being armed.⁴⁶

At that point, I was trying to deescalate ... the situation by using the 40-millimeter less lethal launcher to try to take the suspect into custody without using lethal.⁴⁷

Second Discharge, one 40mm round from an approximate distance of 23 feet.

According to Officer Yah Camara, Vasquez continued moving back and forth when Sergeant Alfaro directed Officer Yah Camara to discharge the 40mm LLL for a second time. Officer Yah Camara discharged a second 40mm round because the first one was ineffective and Vasquez was still pacing back and forth while being armed with a knife.

Officer Yah Camara recalled,

He's moving back and forth. I get another round, put it in the chamber of the 40-millimeter. I'm directed to ... deploy the 40 again ... By Sergeant Alfaro. I don't have a shot. I keep calling ... it when I was like, "Oh, I don't have a shot," ... due to him moving back and forth. At one point, probably like a minute after or like a couple seconds after ... the first shot, I see him. I have a shot. Deploy ... the 40- millimeter. I shoot him again like in the stomach area. Ineffective. He's still move[sic] ... back and forth, not listening to commands the officers ... are giving him.⁴⁸

Because the first one was ineffective and then at that point the suspect was still pacing back and forth while being armed with a knife.⁴⁹

In its review of the TASER discharge, the UOFRB considered that Vasquez escalated the situation when he exited his bedroom armed with two machetes, and that Officer Nelson discharged the TASER to defend himself, as well as Officers Barrera and Yah Camara from an armed suspect rapidly closing the distance between the officers.

The UOFRB considered several factors during their assessment of the 40mm LLL discharges. The factors taken into consideration included Vasquez previously attempting to attack the officers with two machetes, the continuing threat posed by Vasquez who refused to surrender by

⁴⁵ Officer Yah Camara, Second Interview, Page 14, Lines 14-16, 23-25 and Page 15, Line 1

⁴⁶ Officer Yah Camara, Second Interview, Page 15, Lines 14-18

⁴⁷ Officer Yah Camara, Second Interview, Page 18, Lines 2-5

⁴⁸ Officer Yah Camara, First Interview, Page 16, Lines 11-13, 16-20, 22-25 and Page 17, Lines 1-2

⁴⁹ Officer Yah Camara, Second Interview, Page 16, Lines 15-17

evading arrest, and Vasquez still being in possession of the large kitchen knife. The UOFRB noted that those factors amounted to Vasquez violently resisting arrest and posing an immediate threat of violence to the officers, as well as the larger community.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officers Nelson and Yah Camara, while faced with similar circumstances, would believe that the same applications of less-lethal force would be reasonable to protect themselves and others, as well as to effect the arrest of Vasquez.

Therefore, I find Officers Nelson and Yah Camara's Less-Lethal Use of Force to be objectively reasonable and In Policy, No Further Action.

Lethal Use of Force

Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:

- *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
- *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).*

Officer Barrera – .45 caliber, eight rounds in two volleys, in a southerly direction from an approximate distance of eight feet.

First Volley, Rounds One through Six

According to Officer Barrera, when Officer Yah Camara opened Vasquez' bedroom door, Officer Barrera observed Vasquez immediately launch in the direction of Officer Yah Camara, while holding two machetes. Officer Barrera observed Vasquez swing the machete, which Vasquez held in his left hand, in a forward and up-and-down motion in the direction of Officer Yah Camara, who was approximately three feet away. Believing that Vasquez was going to attack his partner with the machete and cause his partner serious injury, Officer Barrera fired approximately four or five rounds at Vasquez. Officer Barrera fired his service pistol to stop the threat, while assessing after each shot. After each shot fired, Officer Barrera stated he observed that Vasquez was still up and still doing the motions towards Officer Yah Camara.

Note: During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that Officer Barrera fired six rounds from an approximate distance of eight feet. The time that elapsed between Round One and Round Six was approximately two seconds.

Officer Barrera recalled,

So at one point in time, we set up a plan. My partner and I were the point officers. I had my arrest team, and I had less lethal. We had a 40 less lethal and Sergeant was gonna [sic] be comms. It was ... a tight space. The house was very small so my partner, the best he could reached for the door handle ... Attempted to open it and redeploy. That's when I observed the suspect immediately launch in a direction of my partner holding two machetes. And I heard the clinging metallic noise, and I immediately -- well, before that as soon as I saw the machete coming out, I unholstered, drew my weapon, fired a shot assessing to immediately protect my partner. It was immediate threat ADW ... I fired approximately maybe five, four shots.⁵⁰

After he successfully opened the door, I see immediately the suspect holding on to machetes. He's wearing a red shirt and with his left hand, he swings in the forward -- up-and-down motion machete in the direction of my partner who's maybe three feet away ... It ... was a dark ... full-size machete. Maybe I don't know, three feet, four feet.⁵¹

I discharged my weapon ... Because I reasonably believed that he was going to attack my partner with the machete. Cause him serious injury.⁵²

I was still on target looking at the suspect and on my sight. After each round, the suspect was still up and doing ... the motion towards my partner ... After each shot, ... I kept looking at the suspect ... as soon as I assessed, I kept ... pressing the trigger.⁵³

Second Volley, Rounds Seven and Eight

According to Officer Barrera, Vasquez retreated back into the bedroom after the first volley of shots fired. Approximately half a second later, Vasquez came back out in the direction of Officer Yah Camara while still having control of the machetes. Believing that Vasquez could seriously injure his partner, Officer Barrera fired two rounds at Vasquez to stop the threat. After the final round, Vasquez dropped the machete and immediately closed the door.

Note: During the UOFRB, FID investigators presented that approximately two seconds after Officer Barrera's First Volley, Officer Barrera fired two additional rounds from an approximate distance of seven feet. The time that elapsed between Round Seven and Round Eight was approximately one second.

The total time elapsed between Round One and Round Eight was approximately five seconds.

⁵⁰ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 9, Lines 15-25 and Page 10, Lines 1-5

⁵¹ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 48, Lines 20-24 and Page 49, Lines 7-9

⁵² Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 53, Lines 9, 12-13 and 15

⁵³ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 54, Lines 10-13 and 16-18

Officer Barrera recalled,

At one point in time, the suspect retreated back into the bedroom maybe half a second, and he came back up, and that's when I shot approximately two more shots after that. And after the second -- the last shot, ... I discharged. He dropped the machetes and he immediately closed the door, and we lost sight of him after that. I believe if I had not discharged my weapon, he could have in the close proximity that the bedroom where my partner was getting covered to the bedroom where the suspect was, he could have seriously hurt my partner.⁵⁴ He still had control ... of the machetes. After ... I had discharged, he backed up into the bedroom so ... I kind of -- I pried out, and ... he came back out still in the direction of my partner. That's when I discharged another two rounds, and he dropped one of the machetes from his left hand, but then he closed the door.⁵⁵

After ... he retreated, I told him to drop the machete in Spanish, and he came back out again ... still armed.⁵⁶

Came back out armed with a long sharp object and then took a step towards my partner who was still in the same position from previous when he repositioned to the bedroom ... Still armed with the two machetes in his hand. The two sharp -- one machete and the other sharp object in his hand.⁵⁷

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review of the incident. During their review, the UOFRB took into consideration that Vasquez was in possession of a machete and a large kitchen knife. Vasquez rapidly escalated the incident when he exited his bedroom, lunging towards officers with an edged weapon in each hand. The UOFRB noted that Officer Barrera used lethal force to prevent serious bodily injury to himself and his partner.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Barrera continued to assess after firing each round and observed that the machete was in Vasquez' hand after firing each round. Officer Barrera continued to fire to stop the threat. In addition, UOFRB noted that when Vasquez retreated, Officer Barrera immediately ceased firing. Officer Barrera reengaged Vasquez when he came back out of the bedroom with the machetes, while rapidly approaching the officers.

The incident rapidly escalated due to Vasquez' actions. The UOFRB considered the minimal amount of time which Officer Barrera had to make decisions based on the imminent threat posed by Vasquez to Officer Yah Camara, due to the confined space of the residence. The UOFRB noted that Officer Barrera articulated his perception of an imminent threat, when Vasquez, armed with a machete and a large kitchen knife, lunged in the direction of Officer Yah Camara. Officer Barrera specifically articulated his reason for the use of lethal force, which was to defend his partner. The UOFRB also considered Officer Barrera's assessment of Vasquez' actions between each discharged round.

⁵⁴ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 10, Lines 5-14

⁵⁵ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 53, Lines 19-25

⁵⁶ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 54, Lines 21-23 and 25

⁵⁷ Officer Barrera, First Interview, Page 57, Lines 4-7 and 11-13

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Barrera, would reasonably believe Vasquez' actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, I find Officer Barrera's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

Front Desk Procedures – The investigation revealed that Officer J. Garcia, Serial No. 43407, Rampart Patrol Division, was assigned as the Rampart Front Desk Officer on July 16th, 2019.⁵⁸ Officer Garcia did not enlist the assistance of a Spanish speaking officer nor contact the Communications Division Language Bank to assist in her interaction with the Spanish speaking PR. According to Officer Garcia, an older Spanish speaking couple came into the station and sought advice regarding a landlord/tenant dispute. Officer Garcia determined that there was no crime and provided them with a business card to CD's non-emergency Spanish speaking line. According to Officer Garcia, she felt that the couple could better articulate the information to CD, but advised them to stay at the front desk until they completed the phone call and ensured that a patrol unit would be dispatched to their residence. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Gonzalez, Serial No. 34703, Commanding Officer, Rampart Patrol Division, who advised that this issue was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). The Commanding Officer of Operations - Central Bureau (OCB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Body Worn Video Activation – The investigation revealed that Officer Garcia did not activate her BWV camera during the interaction with the PR at the front desk at Rampart CPS. Officer Garcia stated that she did not activate her BWV camera for the contact because the contact did not involve a criminal investigation and Officer Garcia was only providing advice to the couple.

The investigation revealed that Officers Barrera and Yah Camara did not activate their BWV cameras during the interaction with the PR. According to Officer Yah Camara, he did not activate his BWV camera at the time because he and his partner were flagged down, and he deemed the interaction to be a consensual encounter.

The investigation revealed that Officers Cross and Graber powered off their BWV cameras at scene while LAFD personnel conducted a medical assessment of Vasquez in the RA prior to transportation.

The investigation revealed that Officer Cross deactivated his BWV camera prior to the completion of Vasquez' transport to LAC+USCMC while Officer Cross was inside of the LAFD RA.

⁵⁸ At the time of the incident Officer Garcia was a probationary officer with approximately one year in the field.

The investigation revealed that Officer Nelson captured two BWV recordings related to this incident. Officer Nelson's BWV camera was in the powered off mode immediately preceding its activation upon arrival at scene. Therefore, the first video recording did not capture the two full minutes of buffering prior to activation. In addition, Officer Nelson powered off his BWV camera as he exited the PR's residence to retrieve the 40mm LLL from his police vehicle. Therefore, his second video recording did not capture the two full minutes of buffering prior to activation as well.

The investigation revealed that Officer Williams' BWV camera was in the powered off mode immediately preceding its activation inside the PR's residence. Therefore, his BWV recording did not capture the two full minutes of buffering prior to activation. In addition, Officer Williams' BWV camera was activated late and did not capture the primary unit's briefing of the incident.

The investigation revealed that Officer Cruz' BWV camera was activated late and did not capture the audio of the initial portion of his emergency response driving.

The investigation revealed that Officers Castaneda, Cortez, Posner, and Solorio's BWV cameras were in the powered off mode immediately preceding their response to the OIS scene. Therefore, their BWV recordings did not capture two full minutes of buffering prior to activation.

The investigation revealed that Officer Munoz' BWV recording of this incident began on a previous pedestrian stop, unrelated to the OIS, but captured his involvement in CUOF incident in its entirety. Officer Munoz' BWV was in the powered off mode prior to the initiation of the recording of the unrelated pedestrian stop. Therefore, the BWV recording did not capture the two full minutes of buffering prior to activation during the pedestrian stop. Officer Munoz activated his BWV camera approximately thirteen seconds after the initiation of the unrelated pedestrian stop.

The aforementioned BWV activation issues were brought to the attention of Captain Gonzalez. Rampart Area completed an analysis and found that the officers mentioned above had no prior BWV related issues. As a result, Captain Gonzalez advised that these issues were addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a SAI for each officer. In addition, Captain Gonzalez, along with Captain A. Lopez, Serial No. 30243, Commanding Officer, Rampart Area, attended numerous roll calls over the past year explaining and reinforcing the importance of BWV. The commanding officers also held two formal supervisory meetings in addition to the monthly deployment meetings with the Area watch commanders where they discussed BWV policies and procedures. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with these actions. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Note: The Office of Operations is currently tasked with eliminating deviations from Department policy with regard to BWV and Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS). As part of this ongoing project, OO is revising current inspection procedures to establish consistency

in inspection standards and reporting amongst all four geographic bureaus, as well as developing methods to ensure compliance with Department policy. The Office of Operations is establishing a working group with additional representatives from Employee Relations Group (ERG), the Office of the Los Angeles City Attorney, and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to develop additional methods to reduce deviations.

Watch Commander's and Supervisor's Daily Reports – The investigation revealed that the Watch Commander's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Driller indicated that Detective Garcia monitored Officers Yah Camara and Nelson. Detective Garcia's log did not indicate the times, nor location, the officers were separated and monitored. This issue was brought to the attention of Captain Gonzalez, who advised that this issue was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

The investigation revealed that the Watch Commander's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Driller, as well as, the Sergeant's Daily Report completed by Detective Marino indicated that Sergeant Alfaro was monitored at Rampart CPS at 2000 hours; however, the Gang Enforcement Detail - Supervisor's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Alfaro indicated the time of monitoring was 1955 hours.

The Sergeant's Daily Report completed by Detective Marino indicated that Sergeant Alfaro was interviewed by FID at 0535 hours; however, the Gang Enforcement Detail - Supervisor's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Alfaro indicated the time of the interview was 0530 hours.

The Watch Commander's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Driller indicated Sergeant Solis arrived at Rampart CPS with Officer Barrera at 1932 hours; however, the Sergeant's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Solis indicated the time of arrival was 1937 hours.

The Watch Commander's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Driller indicated Sergeant Savedra arrived at Rampart CPS with Officers Posner, Rossello, Canales, and Arroyo at 2110 hours; however, the Sergeant's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Savedra indicated the time of arrival was 2115 hours.

The Watch Commander's Daily Report completed by Sergeant Driller indicated the DOC was notified at 1910 hours; however, the DOC notification log indicated the time of notification was 1912 hours.

The aforementioned inconsistencies in the documentation of time were brought to the attention of Captain Gonzalez, who advised that these issues were addressed through an informal meeting with Rampart Area supervisors. The supervisors were advised to use the same method of time keeping to ensure consistency in documentation. The Commanding Officer of OCB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS) – Rampart Area police vehicles were equipped with DICVS. The DICV recording from Officers Pintado and Munoz’ police vehicle captured Officer Carlson and Vasquez running west on the north side of Temple Street and into the 7-Eleven parking lot.

Body Worn Video (BWV) – Rampart Area personnel were equipped with BWV. There were multiple officers who activated their BWV cameras during this incident.

Officers Barrera and Yah Camara’s BWVs captured the OIS, Less-Lethal Use of Force, and portions of the Non-Lethal Use of Force. Officers Nelson, Carlson, and Williams’ BWV captured portions of the OIS, Less-Lethal Use of Force, and Non-Lethal Use of Force. Sergeant Alfaro’s BWV captured portions of the OIS, Less-Lethal Use of Force, and Non-Lethal Use of Force, as well as his command and control actions during the incident. Sergeant Emerick’s BWV captured a portion of his command and control actions.

Outside Video – Two security camera videos from the 7-Eleven convenience store located at 3555 Temple Street were identified and obtained by FID investigators. One security video depicts three camera views of the store’s interior, while the other depicts sixteen camera views of the store’s interior. The videos captured Vasquez and the officers entering the store, officers setting up containment, the deployment of the 40mm LLL, and Vasquez being taken into custody.

Chief’s Direction

To enhance the future performance and increase awareness, I have instructed the Director of OO to remind Department personnel of the principals and guidelines with regard to Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 5, Tactical Disengagement, which was first published on July 11, 2019. This reminder will include an emphasis of the procedures to consult additional Department resources including the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) Watch Commander or the Metropolitan Division Watch Commander, when the criteria for such consultation has been achieved.

Respectfully,



MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: 5-15-20

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 033-19	CF No.	DR No. 19-0214930
SHOOTING		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 309 North Commonwealth Avenue	RD 212	Date of Incident July 16, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review April 06, 2020 1230 Hours
Chairman Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members: 		
Member (Office Representative) Commander M. Rimkunas, Serial No. 32211			
Member (Personnel and Training Bureau) Commander R. Flores, Serial No. 30995			
Member (Bureau) Deputy Chief V. Palazzolo, Serial No. 27433			
Member (Peer) Sergeant J. Severns, Serial No. 33807			
Member (Peer) Officer H. Haile, Serial No. 42436			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain A. Gonzalez, Serial No. 34703			
Notes:			
<p style="text-align: right;">RECEIVED MAY 22 2020</p> <p style="text-align: right;">OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL</p> <p style="text-align: right; color: blue;">2020 MAY 15 PM 2:46</p>			
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <input type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: _____ </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Alfaro, Brian		Serial No. 38481	Rank/Class Sergeant I	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 12 years, 5 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 1 year, 8 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
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<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes: (JA) 2/20/08 (JA) 2/20/08

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Barrera, Jose		Serial No. 42791	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 7 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 1 year, 9 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Canales, Anthony		Serial No. 38671	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 12 years, 2 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 9 years, 10 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes:
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*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Carlson, Brenna		Serial No. 43122	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 0 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 0 years, 8 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Emerick, Juan		Serial No.	Rank/Class Sergeant I	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 24 years, 3 months		Current Division Rampart	Time in Current Division 1 year, 0 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Nelson, Patrick		Serial No. 42809	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 7 months		Current Division Rampart	Time in Current Division 1 year, 6 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint		Notes:		
<input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed				

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Williams, Dean		Serial No. 41952	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 4 years, 5 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 3 years, 7 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Less-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Non-Lethal Use of Force</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Notes:				
<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed		Notes:		

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Yah Camara, Ruben		Serial No. 42823	Rank/Class Police Officer II	Incident No. 033-19
Length of Employment 2 years, 7 months	Current Division Rampart		Time in Current Division 1 year, 9 months	
Use of Force Review Board		Chief of Police		Police Commission
Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval		Tactics <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Less-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Non-Lethal Use of Force <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Non-Lethal Use of Force <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
Unintentional Discharge <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)		Unintentional Discharge <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
Other Issues <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)		Other Issues <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

Notes:

**Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/
Administrative Disapproval Finding**

- ☐ Extensive Retraining
☐ Notice to Correct Deficiencies
☐ Personnel Complaint
☐ Employee's Work History Reviewed

Notes:

*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.